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Case and Comment
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW —  CROWN —  CROWN CORPORATIONS —  
PREROGATIVE —  EXECUTIONS —  PRIORITIES —  COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTION.
The changing face of government activity over the past few 
decades has caused the courts to take a serious look at the Crown 
prerogative of priority of payment over ordinary creditors in 
executions against a debtor. Whether or not the Crown may 
claim the prerogative where it ventures into areas of commercial 
enterprise was the problem in Regina (Provincial Treasurer) v. 
Workmen’s Compensation Board and Edmonton (City.)1 The 
action here was brought pursuant to an interpleader order to 
determine priorities in payment out of a fund in the hands of the 
sheriff, among the Crown in the right of Alberta, the Workmen’s 
Compensation Board and the City of Edmonton. The Board had 
filed a distress warrant in respect of the recovery of unpaid assess­
ments. Afterwards a distress warrant was filed on behalf of the 
Provincial Treasurer of Alberta based on two chattel mortgages 
made by the debtor company to secure advances from the Treasury 
to the debtor. Under the Crown’s warrant seizure of specific 
chattels was authorized and made. Subsequently the City of 
Edmonton filed a distress warrant in respect of a claim for unpaid 
business taxes. Ultimately the Board instructed the sheriff to sell 
the chattels seized under the Treasurer’s warrant and the three 
parties claimed priority in the disbursement of the fund. The 
Crown based its claim on a common law prerogative to have first 
payment out of the assets of a Crown debtor.
Buchanan, C.J.D.C., held that the order of priorities was 
the City, the Board, and the Crown. The interesting aspect of 
the decision is the narrowing of the prerogative effected by the 
trial judge. After discussing several cases outlining the prerogative 
he followed the dicta in Food Controller et al. v. Cork,2 a 1923 
House of Lords decision, and decided that the debt arising out of 
the chattel mortgages was not within the scope of debts tradition­
ally covered by the royal prerogative, and that no priority vests 
in the Crown where the debt is one of a commercial nature. On 
appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta,
1 (1962), 39 W.W.R. 291; (1963), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 166.
2 [1923] A.C. 647.
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the court affirmed his decision on the point without further con­
sidering the question, though the appeals were allowed on another 
ground.3
The Crown has long exercised the privilege of having first 
payment out of a debtor’s assets. Initially, at common law, this 
privilege embraced the right to prevent a subject from suing the 
King’s debtor until the King’s debt had been paid. However the 
scope of the narrow prerogative was substantially restricted by 
subsequent legislation. By the statute 25 Edw. 3, c. 19, in 1351, 
a subject creditor was allowed to sue the King’s debtor, although 
this was qualified by the condition that he could not have execu­
tion upon his judgment until the King’s debt had been satisfied.4 
It is of interest to note that the question of priority in execution 
did not really arise here since the subject’s right to execute was 
contingent upon the satisfaction of the King’s claim and did not 
exist concurrently with that claim. Later, in 1541, by the 
statute 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, the rights of the subject were extended 
to permit execution without first satisfying the King’s debt.5 The 
issue of priority was thus conceived, since the subject creditor 
could validly issue a writ of execution upon his judgment to bind 
his debtor’s goods. At the same time the Crown could initiate 
its process of recovery by writ of extent, issuing out of the Court 
of Exchequer, which bound the debtor’s property upon teste.“ 
The two writs necessarily came into conflict, illustrating the basic 
situation in which the Crown, over the years, has insisted on a 
right to first execution.
In such situations, where Crown and subject both have valid 
processes subsisting, competing for satisfaction out of a common 
debtor’s property, the Crown’s right to priority is generally con­
sidered to be predicated on a wide prerogative, judicially recog­
nized as early as Lord Coke’s time7 and enunciated by Macdonald, 
C.B., in the early leading case, The King v. Wells.9 In that case 
the Chief Baron held that wherever a subject’s writ of execution 
upon a judgment and the King’s writ of extent concurred, both 
attaching at some time before the sale of the debtor’s goods, then 
the King’s title was to be preferred. He said:
3 (1963), 42 W.W.R. 226.
4 Giles v. Grover (1832), 9 Bing. 128, at pp. 281-2; 131 E.R. 563, at 
p. 621, per Lord Tenterden.
5 Ibid.
6 Stringefellow v. Brownesoppe (1549), 1 Dy. 676; 73 E.R. 142; The 
King v. Cotton (1751), Parker, 112; 145 E.R. 729.
7 Quick’s Case (1611), 9 Co. Rep. 129a; 77 E.R. 916.
8 (1796), 16 East, 278; 104 E.R. 1094.
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I take it to be an incontrovertible rule of law, that where the 
King’s and the subject’s title concur, the King’s shall be preferred 
. . . That in the case of two executions subsisting at the same 
time, the Crown’s and the subject’s title do concur; . . . each 
derives under his execution a title to be satisfied his debt out of 
the effects of his debtor. Both executions are in force at some one 
point of time before either is executed; the instant they thus 
concur, the King’s prerogative to be preferred attaches . . .°
In Giles v. Grover,™ Baron Alderson complemented that 
statement by referring to the situation where a creditor has com­
pleted his execution by sale, before the King’s writ is issued. He 
added:
If, however, the right of the subject be complete and perfect 
before that of the King commences, it is manifest that the rule 
does not apply, for there is no point of time at which the two 
rights are in conflict; nor can there be a question which of the 
two ought to prevail in a case where one, that of the subject, 
has prevailed already . .
The cases indicate that this wide prerogative, brought to 
the fore by Chief Baron Macdonald, has been judicially adopted to 
effect recovery of Crown debts over a wide range of situations. 
For instance, the prerogative has been claimed and applied to 
recover such debts owing to the royal revenue as duties for malt,“  
property and income taxes,13 rent owing for the lease of Crown 
property,14 deposits by government departments claimed in the 
liquidation of a bank,13 and taxes due under the Special War 
Revenue Act.18 Generally, the prerogative was claimed to recover 
money owed directly to the government coffers arising out of 
normal and traditional government activities. It was applied 
liberally and its scope was not questioned until early in the present 
century.
It is significant to note that authorities indicate that this 
“wide” prerogative is not particularized to cases involving execu­
tions against Crown debtors but is of much more comprehensive 
scope “determining a preference in favour of the Crown in all 
cases, and touching all rights of what kind soever, where the 
Crown’s and the subject’s right concur, and so come into compe­
9 (1796), 16 East, 278, at p. 282; 104 E.R. 1094, at p. 1096.
10 (1832), 9 Bing. 128; 131 E.R. 563.
11 (1832), 9 Bing. 128, at pp. 156-7; 131 E.R. 563, at p. 574.
12 The King v. Wells (1796), 16 East 278; 104 E.R. 1094.
13 In re Henley & Co. (1878), 9 Ch. D. 469; Comm’rs of Taxation for
N.S.W. v. Palmer et al., [1907] A C. 179.
14 Attorney-General v. Leonard (1888), 38 Ch. D. 622.
15 The Queen v. The Bank of Nova Scotia (1886), 11 S.C.R. 1.
16 Re D. Moore Co. Ltd., [1928] 1 D.L.R. 383; Re Tyrer Co. Ltd., [1930]
4 D.L.R. 320.
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tition”.17 The vague generality of the substantive right has allowed 
the courts to limit its operation in the light of social, political and 
economic change, without, strictly speaking, contravening the 
traditional privilege of the Crown.
The expanding field of government activity originating about 
the turn of the century and rapidly intensifying through the period 
of the two Great Wars into the present day has given rise to the 
problem which is the subject of this comment. The Crown has 
moved into the traditional jurisdiction of private enterprise in 
building its vast corporate empire, some aspects of which are com­
pletely controlled by government, others merely directed or semi- 
controlled. Judicial notice of the change was taken in Food Con­
troller v. Cork,1* by Lords Birkenhead, Atkinson, and Shaw in 
the House of Lords and by Lord Stemdale, M.R., in the Court of 
Appeal.1* These judges, in strong dicta, doubted that the Crown 
prerogative could be exercised to recover commercial or trading 
debts owed to large government departments in priority over 
ordinary creditors. In this case the Food Controller, in the exer­
cise of statutory powers, appointed a company as agent to sell on 
commission and distribute frozen rabbits imported from Australia 
by the Board of Trade. The company sold the rabbits and was 
bound to pay over to the Food Controller the purchase money 
less commission. The company went into voluntary liquidation and 
the Food Controller claimed to be paid in priority over other 
creditors on the ground that this was a Crown debt. The Law 
Lords decided that the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 
bound the Crown with respect to the prerogative, by virtue of a 
common law rule of statutory interpretation which lays down that 
where a statute specifically or impliedly makes reference to the 
Crown, it is bound thereby. However, in important dictum, the 
Earl of Birkenhead, L.C., said:
The construction which I adopt makes it superfluous to embark 
upon any general consideration of the prerogative, or of the differ­
ence between Crown debts as the term was used generations ago 
and that term in a changed age, when it governs sums of money 
owing to the immense trading establishments which various 
Government Departments have been authorized to create.20
17 The King v. Wells (1796), 16 East, 278, at p. 282; 104 E.R. 1094, at 
p. 1096; Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 7, p. 326; Crowther
v. Attorney-General of Canada (1959), 17 D.L.R. (2d) 437, per
Macdonald, J.
18 [1923] A.C. 647.
19 sub nom., In re H. J. Webb A Co. (Smithfteld, London) Ltd., [1922]
2 Ch. 369.
20 [1923] A.C. 647, at p. 657.
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Lord Atkinson said:
I concur with the Master of the Rolls in thinking that the 
expression “Crown debts” and “debts due to the Crown” are 
unfortunate expressions, inasmuch as they suggest, at least to the 
uninitiated, that the Sovereign claims the right to be paid debts 
due to him, to the exclusion of the rights of his subjects, either 
for his own use or for the public use as determined by him. Ages 
ago these words would probably be considered to apply to taxes 
or suchlike, but now, and especially during the war, when the 
different Departments of Government became more like great 
trading and industrial corporations than anything else, it is obvious 
that it leads to misunderstanding when the trade debts due to 
these Corporations are sought, by the exercise of the royal prerog­
ative, to be recovered in priority to those due to subject 
creditors . .
And Lord Shaw:
My Lords, I venture to interpose much doubt as to the appli­
cation or extension of the expression used by Macdonald, C.B.,
“that when the King’s and the subject’s title concur the King’s 
shall be preferred,” and the modernization of it given by Lord 
Macnaghten,22 to cases of ordinary commercial or industrial 
contracts entered into by a Government department in the course 
of the business or enterprise which it carries on. If a special 
statute confers upon such departments priorities, preferences, 
excuses for misfeasance or exemptions from liability, then of 
course the statute controls the situation. But if the propositions 
above cited should ever be used to justify or widen the royal 
prerogative by the inclusion of ordinary contracts into the range 
of privilege, then it is, I think, very important to realize that this 
dictum of Lord Macnaghten’s occurred in a case in which the 
nature of the debts, as Crown debts, and that in a very strict 
sense, was clear beyond all question. . . .**
A little further on he adds:
How is this a Crown debt? It springs out of no power vested 
in the Crown by way of the imposition of a duty or a tax. It is 
not in the ordinary enumeration of debts incurred for the 
service of the country. It is an instance simply of a debt arising 
under ordinary transactions of principal and agent. A Govern­
ment Department, in the course of realizing Government property, 
appointed an agent to conduct a transaction. That agent defaulted 
to the extent of nearly £10,000 and then became bankrupt. The 
debt arises purely in commercio.*4
It is on these remarks that Chief Judge Buchanan based his 
distinction in Regina v. Workmen’s Compensation Board that while 
Crown debts in the traditional sense may be entitled to priority,
21 Ibid., at p. 659.
22 Com m ’rs of Taxation for N.S.W. v. Palmer et al., [1907] A.C. 179.
23 [1923] A.C. 647, at p. 666.
24 Ibid., at p. 667.
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Crown debts in the modem commercial sense are “not of the kind 
or nature held from earliest times to be included in or covered 
by the royal prerogative . .
The problem cited by their Lordships in the Food Controller 
case is certainly not isolated within the narrow confines of the 
situation before them. Their words are reflective of the hard look 
being taken at the applicability of Crown prerogatives in general 
within commercial areas. It is useful to remember that many of 
these rights grew up and became embedded in our law when the 
Crown was something more personal than today’s bureaucratic 
establishment. Judges in past centuries were more inclined to  
condone the unlimited exercise of prerogatives by a more sacro­
sanct Crown image, the King himself, in view of the more active 
role played by the royal personage in the business of government. 
Later, in the nineteenth century, and in this century,2" courts have 
shown a disposition towards allowing the prerogative to operate 
within the confines of normal government activity.
The twentieth century aberration, manifested in government 
sorties into the commercial field through the medium of the Crown 
Corporation, has given rise to the new judicial attitude. The 
trend appears to be against allowing the Crown to carry sovereign 
rights into commercial spheres. For example in Tamlin v. Hanna- 
j o r d where it was sought to identify the British Transport 
Commission with the Crown by the common law “control test”, so 
as to extend Crown privileges to the Commission, Lord Justice 
Denning said:
. . . the proper inference, in the case at any rate of a commercial 
corporation, is that it acts on its own behalf, even though it is 
controlled by a government department.28
This approach was approved in Regina v. Ontario Labour 
Relations Board; Ex parte Ontario Food Terminal Boar dr* where 
the Court refused to hold that the Ontario Food Terminal Board 
was the Crown so as to prevent its being an “employer” under 
the Labour Relations Act.
25 (1962), 39 W.W.R. 291, at p. 302.
26 In re Sid B. Smith Lumber Co. (1917), 25 B.C.R. 126; The King v. 
Star Kosher Sausage Mfg. Co., [1940] 4 D.L.R. 365; Crowther v. 
Attorney-General of Canada (1959), 17 D.L.R. (2d) 437; Stroud and 
Dakota Enterprises Ltd. v. Imperial Oil Ltd. et al. (1961), 28 D.L.R. 
(2d) 366; Emerson v. Simpson (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 603; 
The Queen v. Hamilton (1963), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 545 are some cases 
within the past half-century upholding the prerogative.
27 [1949] 2 All E.R. 327.
28 Ibid., at p. 330.
29 (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 6.
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In another vein, there can be found some suggestion in 
Robinson v. State of South Australia50 that the Crown privilege to 
protection from the introduction in evidence of certain documents 
can rarely be sustained where they relate to the trading, commer­
cial or contractual activities of a state. This was approved in the 
Exchequer Court of Canada by Angers, J., in Dufresne Construc­
tion Co. Ltd. v. The King.31
This trend extends beyond the domestic level into the sphere 
of international law where serious doubts have been cast upon the 
right of a foreign state to claim sovereign immunity with regard 
to state-owned vessels, when the vessels are employed for 
commercial purposes.32 Lord Macmillan seems to capture the 
basic concept in a single sentence:
It is only in modern times that sovereign states have so far 
condescended to lay aside their dignity as to enter the competitive 
markets of commerce, and it is easy to see that different views 
may be taken as to whether an immunity conceded in one set of 
circumstances should to the same extent be enjoyed in totally 
different circumstances.33
These are but a few indications of this prevalent attitude.
The decision in Regina v. Workmen’s Compensation Board 
gives an indication of how far at least one court was prepared to go 
to  restrain the Crown from exercising its prerogative, owing to the 
commercial taint to the transaction. Whether or not this was truly 
a “commercial” debt within the contemplation of the Food 
Controller dicta may be open to doubt. It is arguable that the 
words of Lords Birkenhead and Atkinson go no further than the 
fact situation before the court, and were aimed primarily at 
excluding, from the operation of the prerogative, debts accruing 
to Crown corporations set up to participate in commercial ven­
tures. On the other hand, Lord Shaw, on whom the trial judge 
placed much stress, may be interpreted as excluding all debts of 
any commercial nature whatsoever entered into by any govern­
ment department. The details of the mortgage transaction in 
Regina v. Workmen’s Compensation Board are not set out with 
any degree of clarity, so exclusive reliance must be placed on the 
finding of fact that the debt was one of a “commercial” nature 
within the scope of the Food Controller restriction. As a matter 
of fair comment it should be pointed out that since the applica­
bility of the prerogative rests on the sole consideration as to
30 [1931] A.C. 704.
31 [1935] Ex. C.R. 77, at pp. 88-89.
32 The Cristina, [1938] 1 All E.R. 719, per Lord Macmillan, at 
pp. 725-726; Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba S.A. v. The Republic 
of Cuba, [1962] S.C.R. 598, per Ritchie, J.
33 The Cristina, [1938] 1 All E.R. 719, at p. 726.
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whether or not the debt is “commercial”, perhaps the courts should 
make a more detailed examination of the particular transaction in 
determining this factor.
Notwithstanding that a definite policy approach to the 
question has yet to be clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court of 
Canada, this case stands as an indication that Canadian law seems 
to be moving towards the exclusion of sovereign prerogatives 
where Crown enterprise assumes a commercial complexion.
Alan D. Reid*
INSURANCE —  UNIFORM ACT —  CHANGE OF PREFERRED  
BENEFICIARY —  STATUTORY TRUST —  CAPACITY —  TEST OF 
INSANITY—TESTAMENTARY OR CONTRACTUAL.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal in the case of Re 
Rogers1 deals with a question of considerable interest. The point 
before the court was whether the designation of a preferred bene­
ficiary by the insured could be contested on the ground that the 
insured lacked capacity to make such a declaration. Although this 
issue has been raised before,2 few judges have attempted to 
describe the nature of the transaction by which a preferred bene­
ficiary is designated and the consequent test of mental capacity 
required, preferring, rather, to ground their decision on a more 
general issue: . . It comes down to this simply: Was the act 
mentally and physically really that of the donor?”3
Confining comment to the insurance aspect of the case the 
facts are as follows. In 1958, Rogers took out a policy of insur­
ance on his life naming his parents beneficiaries. By section 
141 ( 2 )4 of the British Columbia Insurance Act (this incorporates 
in substance, as do the Insurance Acts of the other common law 
provinces, the Uniform Life Insurance Act) the parents became 
preferred beneficiaries, and by section 147(1 ) 5 a statutory trust 
was created in their favour. On July 10, 1961, Rogers was 
married to the respondent. On October 11, 1961, he revoked the 
designation of his parents and by declaration named his wife as
* Alan D. Reid, II Law, U.N.B. Mr. Reid is a Sir James Dunn Scholar
in T .aw
1 Re Rogers (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 141.
2 Book v. Book et al. (1900), 32 O.R. 206; Re Boeder and Canadian 
Order of Chosen Friends (1916), 36 O.L.R. 30; Clark v. Loftus, [1912] 
4 D.L.R. 39; Young v. Toronto General Trust Corp. et al., [1939] 4 
D.L.R. 766; Re Isaacs, [1954] O.R. 942.
3 Clark v. Loftus, [1912] 4 D.L.R. 39, per Meredith, J.A., at p. 52.
4 R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 197; R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 150(2).
5 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 156(1).
